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Abstract
This paper presents a systematic approach for analyzing the departure-time choice equilibrium
(DTCE) problem of a single bottleneck with heterogeneous commuters. The approach is based
on the fact that the DTCE is equivalently represented as a linear programming problem with a
special structure, which can be analytically solved by exploiting the theory of optimal transport
combined with a decomposition technique. By applying the proposed approach to several types
of models with heterogeneous commuters, it is shown that the dynamic equilibrium distribution
of departure times exhibits striking regularities under mild assumptions regarding schedule delay
functions, in which commuters sort themselves according to their attributes, such as desired
arrival times, schedule delay functions (value of times), and travel distances to a destination.
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1. Introduction
The modeling and analysis of rush-hour traffic congestion has a rich history, dating back
to the seminal work of Vickrey (1969). In the basic model of Vickrey, it is assumed that a
fixed number of commuters with homogeneous preferences wish to arrive at a single destination
(workplace) at a same preferred time, traveling through a single route that has a bottleneck of
fixed capacity. Each commuter chooses the departure time of his/her trip from home to minimize
his/her generalized trip cost, including trip time, queuing delay at the bottleneck and schedule
delay (i.e., costs of arriving early or late at their destination). The problem is to determine a
dynamic equilibrium distribution of departure times where no commuter can reduce his/her gen-
eralized cost by changing his/her departure time unilaterally. The importance of the problem in
transportation planning and demand management policies has led to various extensions of the
basic model to allow for (1) distributed/heterogeneous preferred departure times, (2) heterogene-
ity in the valuation of travel time and schedule delay, (3) elastic demands and (4) modal/route
choices.
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Despite these extensive studies, however, the extant analysis approaches have some limita-
tions, and are not necessarily organized into a sufficiently general theory that enables us to sys-
tematically understand various extant results. Firstly, most previous studies focus only on a sin-
gle type of user heterogeneity either in the preferred arrival time (e.g., Hendrickson and Kocur,
1981; Smith, 1984; Daganzo, 1985) or in the valuation of travel time and schedule delay (e.g.,
Cohen, 1987; Arnott et al., 1988, 1992, 1994; Ramadurai et al., 2010; van den Berg and Verhoef,
2011; Liu et al., 2015; Takayama and Kuwahara, 2017)1. As a result, little is known about certain
regularities of the equilibrium when there are multiple types of heterogeneity in users’ prefer-
ences. Secondly, most studies restrict their analysis to a special class of schedule functions (e.g.,
a piecewise linear function)2. This is theoretically problematic since it blurs the critical condi-
tions required for the analysis results (e.g., what conditions are essential for the emergence of
“sorting patterns” in the equilibrium? what conditions are required for obtaining an analytical
solution?). Finally, for the models with a general schedule delay function and user heterogene-
ity, systematic and efficient methods for obtaining accurate solutions are still lacking. As shown
by Nie and Zhang (2009), straight-forward formulation of the model (equilibrium conditions)
results in a variational inequality problem with a non-monotone mapping, which implies that a
naı¨ve numerical algorithm neither guarantees convergence nor provides accurate solutions.
This paper presents a systematic approach to analyze a wide variety of models of departure-
time choice equilibrium (DTCE) with a single bottleneck. The proposed approach is based on the
following two facts: (1) the equilibrium can be obtained by solving a structured linear program-
ming (LP) problem and (2) the special structure of the equivalent LP allows us to apply the theory
of optimal transport (Rachev and Ru¨schendorf, 1998; Burkard, 2007; Villani, 2008), which pro-
vides explicit analytical solutions as well as efficient numerical algorithms. More specifically,
we first review close relationships between DTCE and dynamic system optimal (DSO) assign-
ment in a single bottleneck network, and it is shown that the DTCE with heterogeneous users
can be generally constructed from the solution of the DSO assignment. Thus, the analysis of the
DTCE problem is reduced to that of the DSO assignment represented as an LP. We then reveal
that the equivalent LPs for various types of DTCE problems have some structural commonalities,
to which the theory of optimal transport can be, either directly or indirectly, applied. Through
several examples, we demonstrate how the optimal transport theory can be applied to the DTCE
problems, and that the proposed approach enables us to systematically analyze basic properties
of the equilibrium, such as existence, uniqueness, and some regularity of the flow patterns (e.g.,
temporal “sorting” patterns).
As a first example of the approach, we demonstrate that the DTCE problem with hetero-
geneous preferred departure times is analytically solvable and that the sorting property of the
equilibrium flow pattern (i.e., the “First-In-First-Work principle” shown by Daganzo, 1985) can
be understood from the optimal transport theory as a direct consequence of “submodularity” or
the “Monge property” of the schedule cost function. As a second example, we consider the
DTCE problem with heterogeneous schedule cost functions (i.e., users are differentiated accord-
ing to their value of time). For this type of DTCE problem, the straightforward application of
the optimal transport theory is not possible because the schedule cost functions do not satisfy
the Monge property. Nevertheless, by developing an approach in which the optimal transport
1A few exceptions are Newell (1987); and Lindsey (2004); but the former assumes a special class of schedule func-
tions and the latter focuses only on proving the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
2Smith (1984) and Daganzo (1985) are a few exceptions; but they assume that all commuters have a same schedule
delay function.
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theory is applied to the sub-problems generated from Benders decomposition of the original LP,
we can show that the DTCE problem is analytically solvable under mild assumptions regarding
the schedule cost function. Finally, this approach (of combining Benders decomposition with the
optimal transport theory) is further extended to generalized DTCE models with two types of cost
heterogeneity.
In the remainder of this article, Section 2 introduces a LP approach to the DTCE with het-
erogeneous commuters. Section 3 briefly reviews the theory of optimal transport and presents an
illustrative example of how it can be applied to analyze the DTCE problem with heterogeneous
preferred departure times. Section 4 analyzes the DTCE problems with heterogeneous sched-
ule delay cost functions, in which we provide a new analytical approach of combining Benders
decomposition with the optimal transport theory. Section 5 further extends the approach to gen-
eralized DTCE models with two types of cost heterogeneity. Concluding remarks are made in
Section 6.
2. Linear programming approach to the departure time choice equilibrium problems
2.1. Departure time choice equilibrium
We consider a road network with a single O-D pair connected by one route. Users travel one
per vehicle. Users are treated as a continuum, and the total mass is denoted by Q, which is a
given constant. The route has a single bottleneck with a capacity (maximum service rate) of .
The queuing congestion at the bottleneck is described by a point queue model, where a queue is
assumed to form vertically at the entrance of the bottleneck. Departure time from the bottleneck
s 2 S is assumed to be arrival time at the destination, where S  R denotes a sufficient arrival
time window. The free-flow travel time from the origin to the bottleneck is assumed, without
loss of generality, to be zero unless otherwise noted. Users are classified into a finite number K
of homogeneous groups. The index set of groups is denoted by K = f1; 2; : : : ;Kg. Let the mass
of users in group k 2 K be Qk, then, Pk2K Qk = Q.
Each user chooses their departure time from the bottleneck so as to minimize his/her trip
cost. Trip cost is assumed to be additively separable in queuing delay cost, schedule delay cost
and free-flow travel cost. The queuing delay of users with departure time s is denoted by b(s),
and the schedule delay is defined as the difference between actual departure time and preferred
departure time (work start time) from the bottleneck. The schedule delay cost function of users in
group k measured in (queuing) time unit is denoted as ck(s), which is assumed to be a continuous
function and is specified in the later sections. Then, the trip cost of a user in group k departing
from the bottleneck at time s is b(s) + ck(s).
Under the assumptions mentioned above, the departure time choice equilibrium is defined
as the state in which no user could reduce his/her trip cost by changing his/her departure time
unilaterally. The equilibrium condition is summarized as follows:
2.1.1. Users’ optimal choice condition
The first condition is the users’ optimal choice condition:8>><>>:vk = b(s) + ck(s) if xk(s) > 0vk  b(s) + ck(s) if xk(s) = 0 8k 2 K ; 8s 2 S (2.1)
where vk represents the minimum (equilibrium) trip cost for users in group k and xk(s) denotes
group k’s departure flow rate from the bottleneck at time s.
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2.1.2. Queuing condition
In the point queue model (for the details, see Appendix A.1), the queuing delay d(t) for a
user arriving at the bottleneck at time t can be represented by
d˙(t) =
8>><>>:(t)=   1 if d(t) > 0max :[0; (t)=   1] if d(t) = 0 (2.2a)
where (t) is the arrival flow rate at the bottleneck at time t. This implies that the queuing delay
should satisfy8>><>>:d˙(t) = (t)=   1 if d(t) > 0d˙(t)  (t)=   1 if d(t) = 0 , 0  d(t) ? d˙(t)   [(t)=   1]  0: (2.2b)
In this paper, we employ the complementarity condition (2.2b), instead of (2.2a), as the queuing
delay model. This is because it is analytically tractable and its essential features are consistent
with the original point queue model (e.g., the FIFO property holds)3.
Under the assumption of a FIFO service discipline, users departing from the bottleneck at
time s arrive at the bottleneck at time (s)  s   b(s). Then, the relationship between the arrival
and departure flow rates, ((s)) and x(s)  Pk2K xk(s), is as follows:
x(s) = dA((s))=ds = ((s))  (s); (2.3)
where A(t) is the cumulative arrival flow at the bottleneck at time t and  denotes the derivative
operation with respect to bottleneck-departure-time s, i.e.,
(s)  d(s)=ds = 1   b(s); b(s)  db(s)=ds
For users departing from the bottleneck at time s, the queuing delay b(s) is obviously given
by b(s) = d((s)), which implies b(s) = d˙((s))  (s). Combining these with the queuing
delay (complementarity) condition (2.2b), we have
0  b(s) ?  [(s) + b(s)]   x(s)  0:
Since (s) + b(s) = s and thus (s) + b(s) = 1, the queuing delay condition finally reduces to
the following condition:8>><>>:
P
k2K xk(s) =  if b(s) > 0P
k2K xk(s)   if b(s) = 0
8s 2 S: (2.4)
2.1.3. Flow conservation
For each user group k, the integral of the departure flow rate xk(s) from the bottleneck must
be equal to the total mass Qk, that is,Z
S
xk(s)ds = Qk 8k 2 K : (2.5)
3See Ban et al. (2012), Han et al. (2013) and Jin (2015) for more detailed discussions.
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2.2. Equivalent linear programming
The basic idea of the approach employed in this study is that the equilibrium conditions (2.1),
(2.4) and (2.5) reduce to an equivalent LP. This approach was first shown by Iryo et al. (2005)
and Iryo and Yoshii (2007) in a discrete time setting. We briefly describe the approach below but
for a continuous time setting.
Consider first the following infinite-dimensional linear programming (LP):
[2D-LP(x)] min
x0 : Z(x) 
X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s)xk(s)ds (2.6)
subject to
X
k2K
xk(s)   8s 2 S (2.7)Z
S
xk(s)ds = Qk 8k 2 K ; (2.8)
and the associated dual problem:
[2D-LP(u;v)] max
u0;v : Zˇ(u;v)   
Z
S
u(s)ds +
X
k2K
Qkvk (2.9)
subject to ck(s) + u(s)   vk  0 8k 2 K ; 8s 2 S (2.10)
where u(s) and vk are Lagrange multipliers for (2.7) and (2.8), respectively.
The problem [2D-LP(x)] represents the dynamic system optimal (DSO) assignment prob-
lem with no queuing in which total schedule delay cost is minimized subject to the capacity
constraint and flow conservation. As shown in Appendix B, the strong duality for [2D-LP(x)]
holds, implying the following complementary slackness (or optimality) conditions:8>><>>:xk(s)fck(s) + u(s)   vkg = 0ck(s) + u(s)   vk  0; xk(s)  0 8k 2 K ; 8s 2 S (2.11)8>><>>:u(s)f  
P
k2Kxk(s)g = 0
  Pk2Kxk(s)  0; u(s)  0 8s 2 S: (2.12)
The optimality conditions (2.11), (2.12), and (2.8) can be interpreted in several different
ways. One interpretation supposes that a road manager introduces a dynamic congestion pricing
scheme. Comparing the optimality conditions above and the equilibrium conditions (2.1), (2.4),
and (2.5), we easily see that replacing the queuing delay b in the equilibrium condition with the
dynamic prices u leads to the optimality conditions. Thus, we have the following observation.
Observation 1. (Doan et al., 2011; Daganzo, 2013) Suppose that the dynamic toll pattern for
passing the bottleneck is given by the optimal solution u of [2D-LP(u;v)] (or the optimal La-
grange multiplier u of [2D-LP(x)]). Then the equilibrium under the dynamic pricing scheme
achieves the DSO flow pattern x (i.e., the optimal solution of [2D-LP(x)]).
As a variant of the dynamic pricing scheme, we can also consider a time-dependent tradable
permit system, which is designed to resolve the problem of congestion during the morning rush
hour at a single bottleneck; it consists of the following two parts:
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D(s)A(⌧(s))
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[2D-LP]
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of construction of cumulative arrival curve from the solution of [2D-LP(x)]
a) the road manager issues a right that allows a permit holder to pass through the bottleneck
at a pre-specified time period (“bottleneck permits”),
b) a new trading market is established for bottleneck permits differentiated by a pre-specified
time
Note here that the arrival flow rate at a bottleneck at any time period is, from the definition of
the scheme, equal to or less than the number of permits issued for that time period. This implies
that we can completely eliminate the occurrence of queuing congestion by setting the number
of permits issued per unit time to be less than or equal to the bottleneck capacity. Under the
permit system, the optimality conditions (2.11), (2.12), and (2.8) can be directly interpreted as
the equilibrium conditions: (2.11) represents the optimal behavior of users for a given permit
prices u, and (2.12) represents the market clearing (demand-supply equilibrium4) condition of
the permit for departure time s. This leads to the following observation.
Observation 2. (Akamatsu et al., 2006; Akamatsu, 2007; Wada and Akamatsu, 2010; Akamatsu and Wada,
2017) Competitive market equilibrium prices of the time-dependent tradable permits coincide
with the optimal solution u of [2D-LP(u;v)]. Furthermore, the equilibrium under the time-
dependent tradable permit system achieves the DSO flow pattern x (i.e., the optimal solution of
[2D-LP(x)]).
The two interpretations above implicitly assume for the equilibrium under the pricing scheme
(or the DSO flow pattern) that there is no queuing at the bottleneck, which implies that the
departure rates x always coincide with arrival rates at the bottleneck. However, it should be
noted that the problem [2D-LP(x)] describes no queuing mechanisms (other than the capacity
constraint); hence, the arrival rates at the bottleneck need not be equal to the departure rates
x. This leads to another interpretation, in which no economic intervention of road managers is
assumed.
4For each time s, the demand of time period s permit is equal to the departure flow x(s) =
P
k2K xk(s), and the
maximum supply of the permit is given by the bottleneck capacity .
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Observation 3. (Iryo et al., 2005; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007; Akamatsu et al., 2015) The optimal
solution (x;u;v) of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u;v)] is consistent with the equilibrium conditions
if the Lagrange multiplier u in the LPs can be regarded as the queuing delay b in the equilibrium
conditions.
In order for this interpretation to be valid, arrival flow rate  at the bottleneck, which is consistent
with the queuing conditions (A.1)–(A.3) and is constructed from the optimal solution (x;u;v)
of [2D-LP(x)] (see Figure 1), should be physically feasible (i.e., the arrival flow rate is non-
negative and finite). Fortunately, this is true if the schedule cost function satisfies the following
condition: ck(s) >  1 (see Appendix A.2 and Akamatsu et al., 2015), which is consistent with
the sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria in departure-time choice models (Smith,
1984; Lindsey, 2004). This condition is assumed to be satisfied throughout this paper.
3. Monge-Kantorovich problem
In order to obtaine a deeper insight into the properties (such as uniqueness, some regularity
of flow patterns) of [2D-LP(x)] (or the departure time choice equilibrium), the theory of optimal
transport (see, Kantorovich, 1942, 1948; Rachev and Ru¨schendorf, 1998; Burkard, 2007; Villani,
2008) is useful. In this section, we briefly review the role of Monge properties in optimization
and show an illustrative example of its application to the departure time choice equilibrium.
3.1. Monge property and analytical solution
The optimal transport problem in a 2-dimensional discrete space setting is the following
finite–dimensional LP, which is well known as “Hitchcock’s transportation problem” in the op-
erations research and transportation fields:
[2D-OTP] min
x0 : Z2D(x) 
X
i2I
X
k2K
ci;kxi;k (3.1)
subject to
X
k2K
xi;k = Si 8i 2 I = f1; 2; : : : ; Ig (3.2)X
i2I
xi;k = Qk 8k 2 K = f1; 2; : : : ;Kg (3.3)
where vectors S andQ are given constants satisfying
P
i2I Si =
P
k2K Qk.
Before reviewing some useful theorems on the transportation problem, we introduce the fol-
lowing concepts:
Definition. An I  K real matrix C = [ci;k] is called a Monge matrix if C satisfies the following
property (Monge property)
ci;k + ci+1;k+1  ci;k+1 + ci+1;k for all 1  i < I; 1  k < K (3.4)
Also, if the inequality in (3.4) strictly holds, C is termed a strict Monge matrix.
Definition. A function f : R2 ! R is submodular if, and only if,
f (x; y) + f (x0; y0)  f (x; y0) + f (x0; y) for all x  x0; y  y0 (3.5)
Also, if the inequality in (3.5) strictly holds for x < x0; y < y0, f is called a strict submodular
function.
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This implies that an I  K matrix C whose elements are given by ci;k := f (ix; ky) (1  i 
I; 1  k  K) is a (strict) Monge matrix if the function f : R2 ! R is (strict) submodular. Thus,
we will also term the condition (3.5) the (continuous) Monge property. If the inequalities (3.4)
and (3.5) hold in the opposite direction, then the matrix C and function f are said to be an inverse
Monge matrix and supermodular, respectively.
As is well known, a feasible solution to the transportation problem [2D-OTP] can always be
determined by a greedy algorithm termed the northwest corner rule (Hoffman, 1963).
Northwest corner rule
0. Initialized the indices with i := 1 and k := 1.
1. Set xi;k := minfSi;Qkg.
2. Reduce both the supply Si and demand Qk by xi;k: Si := Si   xi;k and Qk := Qk   xi;k.
If some of Si and Qk become zero, then these indices are increased by one.
3. If there still exists an unsatisfied constraint, go back to Step 2.
The Monge property further provides the following useful result:
Theorem 3.1. (Hoffman, 1963, 1985): If the cost matrix C of [2D-OTP] has the Monge property,
then the northwest corner rule yields an optimal solution for arbitrary supply S and demand Q
vectors.
Remarks. It is worthwhile noting that the cost matrix C is not used at all in the northwest
corner rule. This implies that even if we only know that C is a Monge matrix, we can determine
an optimal solution of [2D-OTP] without knowing the explicit values of the cost coefficients. If
the cost coefficients fulfill the inverse Monge property, an optimal solution can be found by the
northeast corner rule5.
Theorem 3.2. (Dubuc et al., 1999): If the matrix C = [ci;k] in (3.1) is a strict Monge matrix, then
the optimal solution of [2D-OTP] is unique (i.e., the solution provided by the northwest corner
rule is the only solution of [2D-OTP]).
A continuous analogue of Theorem 3.1 for the continuous transportation problem is as fol-
lows. Let x 2 X = R and y 2 Y = R be random variables and let F1; F2, and F denote the distri-
bution functions of x; y; and (x; y), respectively. Given a continuous cost function c : R2 ! R,
the continuous optimal transport problem6 can be formulated as
[2D-COTP] min
F2F (F1;F2)
: Z2D(F) 
Z
XY
c(x; y)dF(x; y) (3.6)
where F (F1;F2)  F(x;1) = F1(x); F(1; y) = F2(y);8x; y 2 R	 (3.7)
Note that F1(1) = F2(1).
5In the northeast corner rule, the algorithm begins with the indices with i := 1 and k := K (or i := I and k := 1), then
the index is decreased by one if Qk (or Si) becomes zero in Step 2 in the northwest corner rule.
6We can easily see the correspondence between the problems [2D-COTP] and [2D-OTP] by rewriting the constraints
for supply and demand in [2D-OTP] in terms of cumulative supply and demand (see also Subsection 3.2 for an example).
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Theorem 3.3. (Cambanis et al., 1976; Dubuc et al., 1999) Let F1 and F2 be distribution functions
on R. Furthermore, suppose that Z2D(F) is finite and the cost function c : R2 ! R is a sub-
modular. Then an optimal solution F 2 F (F1;F2) is given by the so-called Fre´chet–Hoeffding
distribution
F(x; y) = minfF1(x);F2(y)g 8(x; y) 2 R2: (3.8)
Furthermore, if the function c is a strict submodular, the solution is unique (i.e., F(x; y) is the
only optimal solution of [2D-COTP]).
We note that the northwest corner rule for the discrete transportation problem can be viewed
as explicit rules for calculating the analytical solution (i.e., Fre´chet–Hoeffding distribution) in
the discrete space setting (Burkard, 2007).
3.2. Illustrative example: Model with heterogeneous preferred departure time
To illustrate the usefulness of the theory of optimal transport in analyzing the departure time
choice equilibrium, we here consider the model with heterogeneous preferred departure times.
A well known sorting property of the equilibrium flow pattern, the so-called First-In-First-Work
(FIFW) principle (Daganzo, 1985), can be understood from the theory of optimal transport as a
direct consequence of the Monge property of the schedule cost function.
Assumption 3.1. The schedule delay cost function is assumed to be identical for all users and
is given by
ck(s)  f ((k; s)); (k; s)  s   k; (3.9)
where k is the preferred departure time of users in group k and a function f : R ! R is
continuous, strictly convex, and has a minimum at  = 0.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that user groups are arranged (indexed) in an increasing order of their
desired arrival times: 1 <    < K. The function ck(s) defined by (3.9) satisfies the strict Monge
property.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
In the above setting in which the departure time is continuous but the preferred departure time
is discrete (Newell, 1987; Lindsey, 2004), all groups experience queue delay to equilibrate the
trip costs of users within each group. This implies that several disjoint departure time windows
can exist in equilibrium. Here we assume that a single joint departure time window (i.e., a single
rush period) Sˆ  [0;T]  S of length T = Q= occurs in equilibrium7, and we focus on the
property of the departure order of users.
For the given equilibrium rush period Sˆ  [0;T], the departure time choice equilibrium (i.e.,
[2D-LP(x)]) can be reduced to an instance of the optimal transport problem, where ck(s) satisfies
7This corresponds to a typical assumption that the cumulative number of users who prefer to departure by time k is
described by a continuous and differentiable S-shaped curve (e.g., Smith, 1984; Daganzo, 1985).
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Figure 2: Illustration of the solution to the problem (3.13)
the strict Monge property.
min
x0 : Z(x) 
X
k2K
Z
s2Sˆ
ck(s)xk(s)ds (3.10)
subject to
X
k2K
xk(s) =  8s 2 Sˆ (3.11)Z
s2Sˆ
xk(s)ds = Qk 8k 2 K (3.12)
Its cumulative form is expressed as
min
F2F
Z
[1;K]Sˆ
c(; s)dF(; s) (3.13)
where F 
n
F(;T) =
P
k0Qk0 ; F(K; s) = s; 8 2 [1;K]; 8s 2 Sˆ
o
(3.14)
Note that F(; y)  Pk0 R s0 xk0 (s)ds, which is a step function of  for a given s. Without loss
of generality, c(; s) is assumed to be a continuous and strict submodular function that satisfies
c(k; s) = ck(s); 8k = 1; : : : ;K; 8s 2 Sˆ.
According to Theorem 3.3, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds, and user groups are arranged (indexed)
in an increasing order of their desired arrival times: 1 <    < K. Then, the solution of
[2D-LP(x)] for the equilibrium rush period Sˆ is unique and its cumulative form is given by
F(; s) = min
8>><>>:X
k0
Qk0 ; s
9>>=>>; 8 2 [1;K]; 8s 2 Sˆ (3.15)
10
# of  cumulative vehicle counts
time
v3
v2
v1
Q1
Q2
Q3
0
0 = T
 (⌧(s))
u(s)
u(s)
schedule delay cost
equilibrium cost queuing delay
⌧1 ⌧2 ⌧3
s1 s2 s3
Figure 3: Optimal departure flow pattern, cost pattern, and resulting arrival flow pattern (K = 3)
Using this analytical solution (3.15), we can show the regularity of the equilibrium flow
pattern. Let
sk 
X
k0k
Qk0= (3.16)
be the time when the cumulative supply s is equal to the cumulative demand
P
k0kQk0 . Then,
the following equation holds (see also Figure 2):
F(k; sk)   F(k   1; sk 1) =
Z sk
sk 1
xk(s)ds = (sk   sk 1) = Qk 8k = 1; 2; : : : ;K: (3.17)
where F(0; s0)  0 and s0 = 0. This equation leads to the following proposition, i.e., the FIFW
principle.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the assumptions in Proposition 3.1 hold. Then, the equilibrium
flow pattern x has the “sorting” property, such that all users in group k depart from the bottle-
neck in a time interval [sk 1; sk] of length Qk= and
s0  0 < s1 < s2 <    < sK 1 < sK = T: (3.18)
The above “sorting” property also implies that the equilibrium cost pattern v and the asso-
ciated queuing delays u can be uniquely determined. Specifically, the following users’ optimal
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choice condition within each group must hold.
vk = u
(s) + ck(s) 8s 2 [sk 1; sk]; 8k 2 K : (3.19)
Then we have
vk := v

k+1   ck+1(sk) + ck(sk) 8k = 1; : : : ;K   1: (3.20)
The recursive equation (3.20) together with a boundary condition (e.g., the queuing delay for
the last user in group K is zero, vK = cK(T)), can be solved easily. Ultimately, the queuing
delay u can be determined by using Eq.(3.19). In addition, the cumulative arrival curve can be
constructed by the optimal solution (x;u;v) above. Figure 3 shows the relationships between
the optimal departure flow pattern, the cost pattern, and the resulting arrival flow pattern for the
simplest case (i.e., linear schedule delay cost function).
4. Analysis of model with heterogeneous value of time
In this section, we consider the departure time choice equilibrium models in which users
have the same preferred departure time  but are classified into K groups (types) differentiated
by schedule delay cost functions. The schedule delay cost for type k users with departure time s
from the bottleneck is denoted by ck(), where   s  is the schedule delay. The function ck()
in this section is assumed to have the following form:
ck(s) =
8>><>>:k f e() if   0 (early arrival)k f l() if   0 (late arrival) ; (4.1a)
f e(0) = f l(0) = 0 (4.1b)
which includes the schedule delay cost functions assumed in conventional models with hetero-
geneous users (e.g., Cohen, 1987; Arnott et al., 1988, 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef,
2011; Ramadurai et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2015; Takayama and Kuwahara, 2017) as special cases.
For notational simplicity, the preferred departure time  will be set to zero in the following (i.e.,
 = s).
4.1. Properties of models with no late arrivals
We first restrict ourselves to the analysis of models with the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1. f e : R ! R is a continuous decreasing function of  for all   0 and
f e(0) = 0, f l()! +1 for all  > 0 (i.e., late arrival is prohibited).
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that Assumption 4.1 holds, and that user groups are arranged (indexed) in
a decreasing order of their value of time parameters for early arrivals: 1 > 2 >    > K > 0.
Then the function ck(s) defined by (4.1) satisfies the strict “inverse” Monge property for s  0.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
As we have seen in Section 2, the departure time choice equilibrium can be obtained by
solving the linear programming problem [2D-LP(x)], whose objective is to minimize the total
schedule delay cost. Since all users have the same preferred departure time , the departure
times that are closer to  are chosen at equilibrium. Thus, we obtain the following apparent
property of an equilibrium departure time window.
12
schedule delay cost
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Figure 4: Schedule delay , heterogeneities k, and schedule delay cost
Lemma 4.2. Under Assumption 4.1, the optimal solution x of [2D-LP(x)] satisfies8>><>>:
P
k2K xk(s) =  if s 2 Sˆ  SP
k2K xk(s) = 0 otherwise
(4.2)
where Sˆ  [ T; 0] of length T = Q=.
These lemmas ensure that [2D-LP(x)] reduces to an optimal transport problemwith a strict in-
verseMonge property. However, to use Theorem 3.3 directly, it is convenient to formulate the op-
timal transport problem as its cumulative form with a strict Monge property, as in Subsection 3.2.
To do this, let us reverse the time direction: z   s; let c(; z) and F(; z) = Pk0 R z0 xk0(z)dz
be the cost and distribution functions for the time windowZ = [0;T] 3 z, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we also assume that c(; z) is a continuous and strict submodular function that
satisfies c(k; z) = ck(z); 8k = 1; : : : ;K; 8z 2 Z. We then have
min
F2F
Z
[1;K]Z
c(; z)dF(; z) (4.3)
where F  F(;T) = Pk0Qk0 ; F(K; t) = z; 8 2 [1;K]; 8z 2 Z	 : (4.4)
We further define the time sk when the cumulative supply z is equal to the cumulative demandP
k0kQk0 , i.e.,
sk 
X
k0k
Qk0=: (4.5)
By applying Theorem 3.3 to this problem, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that Assumption 4.1 holds. Then, the flow pattern of the departure
time choice equilibrium with schedule delay cost function (4.1) has the following properties:
(1) The optimal solution of [2D-LP(x)] (i.e., equilibrium flow pattern x) is unique and given
by the Fre´chet–Hoeffding distribution.
F(; z) = min
8>><>>:X
k0
Qk0 ; z
9>>=>>; 8 2 [1;K]; 8z 2 Z (4.6)
13
time
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queuing delay
c1(s)schedule delay cost
⌧w (= 0) s1 s2
 ˆ1 f e( s1)
Figure 5: Graphical representation of the strong duality for [2D-LP(x)] (K = 2, late arrival is prohibited)
(2) The equilibrium flow pattern x has the “sorting” property, such that all users in group
k depart from the bottleneck in a time interval [ sk; sk 1] of length Qk= (i.e., sk =
sk 1 +Qk=), and
  T =  sK <  sK 1 <    <  s2 <  s1 <  s0  0: (4.7)
As in the case of Subsection 3.2, the equilibrium cost pattern v and the associated queuing
delays u can be uniquely determined (see Figure 5).
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that Assumption 4.1 holds. Then, the cost pattern of the departure time
choice equilibrium with schedule delay cost function (4.1) is unique and is obtained as follows.
vk =
X
k0k
n
ˆk0 f e( sk0 )
o
8k 2 K (4.8)
u(s) =
8>><>>:vk   k f e(s) if s 2 [ sk; sk 1]0 otherwise 8k 2 K (4.9)
where ˆk  k   k+1 > 0 and K+1  0.
Proof. See Appendix D.1.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between costs at equilibrium. Specifically, we can see that
the following equation holds.X
k2K
(sk   sk 1)vk  
Z
S
u(s)ds =
X
k2K
Z  sk 1
 sk
ck(s)ds (4.10)
The first term of the LHS of Eq.(4.10) shows the total area of the rectangles below the equilibrium
trip cost lines (blue bold lines) and the second term shows the red area below the queuing delay
curve (red bold line)8; the equality holds in equilibrium because the difference in the above-
mentioned two areas should be equal to the total area below the schedule delay cost curves
8The red dotted lines in Figure 5 are the so-called isocost queueing curves in the literature (Lindsey, 2004).
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(black bold lines). Furthermore, by recalling that (sk   sk 1) = Qk= and multiplying both sides
of Eq.(4.10) by , we can see the strong duality for [2D-LP(x)].
Z(x) =
X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s)xk(s)ds = 
X
k2K
Z  sk 1
 sk
ck(s)ds
=
X
k2K
Qkvk   
Z
S
u(s)ds = Zˇ(u;v): (4.11)
4.2. Properties of models with no early arrivals
In exactly the same manner as we have discussed above, we can consider the “reverse” case,
in which the following assumption holds:
Assumption 4.2. f l : R ! R is a continuous increasing function of  for all   0 and
f l(0) = 0, f e ! +1 for all  < 0 (i.e., early arrival is prohibited).
Although this assumption (no early arrivals) may seem strange, the results for this case together
with the previous (no late arrivals) case can be used as fundamental building blocks for analyzing
more general cases in Subsection 4.3. As in the case of the previous subsection, the following
lemma and propositions hold.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that Assumption 4.2 holds and that user groups are arranged (indexed) in
decreasing order of their value of time parameters for early arrivals: 1 > 2 >    > K > 0.
Then, the function ck(s) defined by (4.1) satisfies the strict Monge property.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that Assumption 4.2 holds. Then the flow pattern of the departure time
choice equilibrium with schedule delay cost function (4.1) has the following properties:
(1) The optimal solution of [2D-LP(x)] (i.e., equilibrium flow pattern x) is unique and given
by the Fre´chet–Hoeffding distribution.
F(; s) = min
8>><>>:X
k0
Qk0 ; s
9>>=>>; 8 2 [1;K]; 8s 2 Sˆ (4.12)
where Sˆ  [0;T] of length T = Q=.
(2) The equilibrium flow pattern x has the “sorting” property, such that all users in group
k depart from the bottleneck in a time interval [sk 1; sk] of length Qk= (i.e., sk = sk 1 +
Qk=), and
s0  0 < s1 < s2 <    < sK 1 < sK = T (4.13)
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that Assumption 4.2 holds. Then, the cost pattern of the departure time
choice equilibrium with schedule delay cost function (4.1) is unique and is obtained as follows.
vk =
X
k0k
n
ˆk0 f l(sk0)
o
8k 2 K (4.14)
u(s) =
8>><>>:vk   k f l(s) if s 2 [sk 1; sk]0 otherwise 8k 2 K (4.15)
where ˆk  k   k+1 > 0 and K+1  0.
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4.3. Properties of model with early and late arrivals
We are now in a position to consider a general case in which Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 are
relaxed to allow for both of the late and early arrivals.
Assumption 4.3. f e : R ! R is a continuous decreasing function of  for all   0 and
f e(0) = 0, f l : R! R is a continuous increasing function of  for all   0 and f l(0) = 0.
Note that this assumption implies that the schedule delay cost function is strictly quasiconvex
(or unimodal), which is weaker than Assumption 3.1, under which it is required to be strictly
convex.
LetH = fe; lg be the set of indices that indicate either early arrivals (e) or late arrivals (l); Xhk
the total mass of early (if h = e) or late (if h = l) arrival users in group k; Sh the time duration
s   if h = e, s >  if h = l. Under Assumption 4.3, the problem [2D-LP(x)] can be represented
as
[2D-LP(x, X)] min
x0;X0 : Z(x;X) 
X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s) xk(s)ds (4.16)
subject to
X
k2K
xk(s)   8s 2 S (4.17)Z
Sh
xk(s)ds = Xhk 8k 2 K ; h 2 H (4.18)X
h2H
Xhk = Qk 8k 2 K (4.19)
Note that the equivalence between [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(x, X)] is easily confirmed by substi-
tuting Eq.(4.18) into Eq.(4.19).
The properties of the problem [2D-LP(x, X)] can be analyzed using a decomposition. Specif-
ically, we first transform the problem [2D-LP(x,X)] to the following equivalent bi-level program.
min
X0 :
X
h2H
ZM(Xh) (4.20)
subject to Eq. (4.19)
where ZM(Xh)  min
x0 : ZS(x j X
h) 
X
k2K
Z
Sh
ck(s) xk(s)ds (4.21)
subject to Eqs. (4.17) 8s 2 Sh and (4.18).
Since the lower-level (or sub-) problems (for h = e and h = l, respectively) are exactly the same
problems discussed in the previous subsections, the optimal solution x (for a given Xh) and
the associated equilibrium cost (i.e., the optimal Lagrange multiplier) (u; vh) can be obtained
analytically (see Propositions 4.1–4.4). These solutions are useful in the following analysis.
Owing to the strong duality of the subproblems (i.e., Eq.(4.11)), the upper-level (or master)
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problem reduces to the following problem.
min
X0 :
X
h2H
ZM(Xh) =
X
h2H
Zˇ(u;vh j Xh)
=
X
h2H
2666664 ZSh u(s)ds +
X
k2K
Xhkv
h
k
3777775 (4.22)
subject to Eq. (4.19)
In general, an iterative procedure is required to solve the master problem because the dual so-
lution (u;vh) is not expressed as an explicit function of the variable Xh. However, thanks to
the analytical solution obtained in the previous subsections, we can explicitly transform it to a
problem including the decision variable Xh.
Recall that the one-to-one correspondence between the demand distribution Xh and the equi-
librium departure time vector sh (Propositions 4.1 and 4.3), i.e.,
sh0 = 0; s
h
1 = X
h
1=; : : : ; s
h
k =
X
k0k
Xhk0=; : : : ; s
h
K = T
h 
X
k0K
Xhk0=: (4.23)
By using these variables and the relationship (4.11), the master problem can be transformed to
the following problem.
min
sh
:
X
h2H
ZM(sh) = 
X
k2K
Z  sek 1
 sek
ck(s)ds + 
X
k2K
Z slk
slk 1
ck(s)ds (4.24)
subject to 0  sh1      shk      shK 8h 2 H (4.25)
sek + s
l
k =
X
kk0
Qk0= 8k 2 K (4.26)
As shown in Appendix D.2, this problem is a convex programming problem with a strict convex
objective function. We thus obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that Assumption 4.3 holds. The optimal solution of the master problem is
unique.
Proof. See Appendix D.2.
We finally obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that Assumption 4.3 holds. Then the flow pattern of the departure time
choice equilibrium with schedule cost function (4.1) has the following properties:
1. The optimal solution of [2D-LP(x)] (i.e., equilibrium flow pattern x) is unique.
2. The equilibrium flow pattern x has the “sorting” property, such that all users in group k
depart from the bottleneck in time intervals [shk 1; s
h
k];8h 2 H , and
 Te =  seK       se1  0  sl1      slK = Tl: (4.27)
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3. Users in all groups depart from the bottleneck both early and late (i.e., strict inequal-
ity holds in condition (4.27)), the equilibrium values of sek and s
l
k are determined by the
following equations:8>><>>:slk + sek =
P
k0kQk0=
ˆk f e( sek) = ˆk f l(slk)
8k 2 K (4.28)
Proof. See Appendix D.3.
Note that the property 3 always holds, for example, if k=k =  (constant) for all k 2 K
that is the common assumption in the literature (Vickrey, 1973; Arnott et al., 1988, 1992, 1994;
van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Takayama and Kuwahara, 2017) (See Appendix D.3).
4.4. Relation to an existing semi-analytical approach
Before concluding this section, it is worthwhile mentioning a semi-analytical approach pro-
posed by Liu et al. (2015). Their approach uses the analytical solution of the model with a
piece-wise linear schedule delay function (Arnott et al., 1994) to obtain an equivalent variational
inequality (VI) problem that allows closed-form trip cost functions (or mappings). Then, the
solution existence and uniqueness were examined through the VI problem. In the present frame-
work, their equivalent VI corresponds to the master problem (4.22) or (4.24).
To highlight its similarities and differences with respect to the present approach concretely,
let us consider the following VI, which is given as the optimality condition of the master problem
(4.22):
Find X 2 X  fX  0 and Eq.(4.19)g such thatX
h2H
vh(Xh)  (Xh   Xh)  0 X 2 X; (4.29)
where the mapping vh(Xh) is obtained by applying the envelope theorem to the dual subprob-
lems, that is, the equilibrium trip cost function: rZM(Xh) = rZS(u;vh j Xh) = vh(Xh); 8h 2
H : This is almost the same as the VI in Liu et al. (2015), except for the measurement unit of
trip cost, i.e., the problem (4.29) is time-based but that in Liu et al. (2015) is monetary-based.
Although the monetary- and time-based formulations can be transformed in to each other by
changing the scale of schedule penalty coefficients k and k for the case of Liu et al. (2015), the
mathematical properties of the VIs are quite different9.
More specifically, the problem (4.29) has desirable properties (see Appendix D.4 for the
proofs). The mapping of (4.29) is strictly monotone; if the schedule delay function is differen-
tiable, the mapping of (4.29) is symmetric and thus a scalar potential exists for the vector field
vh(Xh), i.e.,X
h2H
I
0!Xh
vh(!)d!
0BBBBB@= X
h2H
ZM(Xh)
1CCCCCA : (4.30)
Therefore, it is easy to obtain the uniqueness of the solutions. On the other hand, the mapping of
Liu et al. (2015)’s VI is not monotone; it is hard to establish the uniqueness property of the VI. It
9A similar conclusion has been observed in (multiclass) static traffic assignment problems (e.g., Larsson et al., 2002).
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should be noted that the proof of the uniqueness property in Liu et al. (2015) is incorrect because
the notion of a P-function is applicable to the uniqueness property for special VI problems (i.e.,
nonlinear complementarity problems) only, and not for general problems such as (4.29) (for
more detailed discussions see Harker and Pang, 1990; Facchinei and Pang, 2003). Further note
that the monetary-based VI is not integrable (i.e., does not reduce to an equivalent LP problem
like [2D-LP(x)]); thus, the theory of optimal transport and efficient solution methods of LP are
not applicable to it.
In sum, the present LP approach is a more powerful and promising way to address more gen-
eral problems. As an example, we will analyze an extended problem with more heterogeneities
in the next section.
5. Analysis of models with two types of cost heterogeneity
This section demonstrates that the proposed approach is applicable to a case with more gen-
eral users’ heterogeneity. Specifically, we here consider a generalized departure time choice
equilibrium model with two types of cost heterogeneities. We then characterize an equilibrium
user sorting pattern and obtain an analytical solution by employing both the three-dimensional
Monge property and a decomposition of the LP formulation of the model.
5.1. Extension to N-dimensional problem
Before introducing the generalized problem, we briefly show that the Monge property and
related useful theorems can be extended toN-dimensional transportation problems. For example,
the three-dimensional transportation problem in a discrete space setting is formulated as follows.
[3D-OTP] min
x0 : Z3D(x) 
X
i2I
X
j2J
X
k2K
ci; j;kxi; j;k (5.1)
subject to
X
j2J
X
k2K
xi; j;k = Si 8i 2 I (5.2)X
i2I
X
k2K
xi; j;k = R j 8 j 2 J (5.3)X
j2J
X
i2I
xi; j;k = Qk 8k 2 K (5.4)
where S;R andQ are given constants satisfying
P
i2I Si =
P
j2J R j =
P
k2K Qk.
The Monge property for higher-dimensional arrays is as follows.
Definition. Let C be a N-dimensional array of size m1  m2      mN. C is termed a Monge
array, if for all in = 1; 2; : : : ;mn, jn = 1; 2; : : : ;mn, n = 1; 2; : : : ;N,
c[s1; s2; : : : ; sN] + c[t1; t2; : : : ; tN]  c[i1; i2; : : : ; iN] + c[ j1; j2; : : : ; jN] (5.5)
where sn  min(in; jn), tn  max(in; jn) for all 1  n  N.
Note that, as shown in Aggarwal and Park (1988), aN-dimensional array C is a Monge array,
if and only if, every two-dimensional submatrix is a Monge matrix. Furthermore, the natural
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extension of the northwest corner rule solves the problem in a greedy way without explicit values
of cost coefficients if C is a Monge array (Bein et al., 1995)10.
As in the two-dimensional case, the continuous Monge property is characterized by a sub-
modular function.
Definition. A function f : RN ! R is said to satisfy the N-dimensional continuous Monge
property, if f is submodular with respect to any two of its arguments:
f (x ^ y) + f (x _ y)  f (x) + f (y) 8x;y 2 RN (5.6)
where x ^ y and x _ y denote the componentwise maximum/minimum of x and y, respectively:
x ^ y  (maxfx1; y1g;maxfx2; y2g; : : : ;maxfxN; yNg) for all 1  n  N
x _ y  (minfx1; y1g;minfx2; y2g; : : : ;minfxN; yNg) for all 1  n  N:
Then, Tchen (1980) showed that Theorem 3.3 can be generalized for anN-dimensional case.
That is, the Fre´chet–Hoeffding distribution:
F(x1; : : : ; xN) = minfF1(x1); : : : ; FN(xN)g 8(x1; : : : ; xN) 2 RN (5.7)
is an optimal solution for the following problem:
min
F2F (F1;:::;FN)
Z
RN
c(x1; : : : ; xN)dF(x1; : : : ; xN) (5.8)
if a function c : RN ! R satisfies the continuous Monge property and the objective function is
finite.
5.2. Simultaneous choice equilibrium model of departure time, location and job choices
We show a simultaneous choice equilibrium model of departure time, location, and job
choices as a generalized departure time choice equilibrium model with two types of cost het-
erogeneity. Consider a long narrow city with a spaceless Central Business District (CBD) where
all job opportunities are located. The CBD is located at the edge of the city, and J discrete
residential locations are indexed sequentially from the CBD in decreasing order: J; : : : ; 1 (see
Figure 6). We denote the set of locations using J  f1; : : : ; Jg. The free flow travel time be-
tween location j and the CBD is l j, and the maximum allowable number of users who live in
each location j 2 J is R j. There are K types of jobs at the CBD, and the labor demand of each
job k 2 K  f1; : : : ;Kg is given by Qk. The road has a single bottleneck with capacity  just
upstream of the CBD; thus, all users must pass through this bottleneck to commute.
There are Q ex-ante identical users in the city. Each user makes departure time, residential
location, and job choices to maximize his/her utility. We assume that a user’s preference is
quasilinear (i.e., the utility function is linear in queuing time units) and let wk, r j and u(s) be the
wage of job k, land rent at location j and queuing delay at time s, respectively. Then, the utility
is defined as follows:
wk   r j   (c j;k(s) + u(s)) (5.9)
10Unlike the two-dimensional case, the problem with a inverseMonge array cannot be solved in a greedy way.
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CBD
j = J
j = J   1
j = 2
j = 1
Figure 6: Spatial setting inside city
where c j;k(s) is a “commuting disutility” (a generalization of schedule delay cost) with two types
of heterogeneity j and k, which will be specified later. Note that all terms of Equation (5.9) are
measured in queuing time units.
By combining a user’s optimal choice condition and the equilibrium condition in each market,
the equilibrium condition is given as follows:8>><>>:V = wk   r j   u(s)   c j;k(s) if x j;k(s) > 0V  wk   r j   u(s)   c j;k(s) if x j;k(s) = 0 8 j 2 J ; 8k 2 K ; 8s 2 S (5.10)8>><>>:
P
j2J
P
k2K x j;k(s) =  if u(s) > 0P
j2J
P
k2K x j;k(s)   if u(s) = 0
8s 2 S (5.11)8>><>>:
P
k2K
R
S x j;k(s)ds = R j if r j > 0P
k2K
R
S x j;k(s)ds  R j if r j = 0
8 j 2 J (5.12)8>><>>:
P
j2J
R
S x j;k(s)ds = Qk if wk > 0P
j2J
R
S x j;k(s)ds  Qk if wk = 0
8k 2 K (5.13)
X
j2J
X
k2K
Z
S
x j;k(s)ds = Q (5.14)
where V represents the equilibrium utility level. The first condition (5.10) is the user’s optimal
choice condition, the second one (5.11) is the queuing delay condition, and the third (5.12) and
fourth (5.13) are the market clearing (or demand-supply equilibrium) conditions for land use and
job markets, respectively.
The model is a variant of the departure time choice equilibrium models that include the loca-
tion choice of users, e.g., Arnott (1998); Gubins and Verhoef (2014); Takayama and Kuwahara
(2017). To keep the model compact, we here assume that the wage wk is dependent only on
demand-supply conditions (5.13) and abstract from the effects from the productivity of firms
or other realistic determinants of the wage. The job-location choice modeling in our formula-
tion corresponds to the celebrated Herbert–Stevens model (Herbert and Stevens, 1960; Wheaton,
1974; Berliant and Tabuchi, 2018) in the urban economics literature. Note that it might be con-
sidered that the simultaneous equilibriummodel of the different time scales choices is unrealistic,
even though theie interactions of them are important factors in relation to appropriate long-term
policies (see Osawa et al., in press, for an example). However, as shown in the next subsection,
we can convert the problem to a bi-level problem where the upper-level (or long-run) problem
is the job-location choice problem and the lower-level (or short-term) problem is the departure
time choice problem; as such, the two problems can be analyzed sequentially.
In parallel with the discussion in the previous sections, this equilibrium model is equivalently
21
written as the following LP:
[3D-LP(x)] min
x0 : Z(x) 
X
j2J
X
k2K
Z
S
c j;k(s)x j;k(s)ds (5.15)
subject to
X
j2J
X
k2K
x j;k(s)   8s 2 S (5.16)
X
k2K
Z
S
x j;k(s)ds  R j 8 j 2 J ; (5.17)X
j2J
Z
S
x j;k(s)ds  Qk 8k 2 K : (5.18)
with
P
j2J R j =
P
k2K Qk = Q, where the price variables u, r, and w are determined as the
Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (5.16), (5.17) and (5.18), respectively.
We see that the equivalent optimization problem [3D-LP(x)] of the generalized departure time
choice equilibrium has almost the same form as the three–dimensional transportation problem
[3D-OTP]. Therefore, if the commuting disutility has theMonge property, the equilibrium sorting
property would be established by the theory of optimal transport. In the next subsection, we will
show an example of such disutility functions.
5.3. Analytical solution and sorting pattern
For the simplicity of exposition, we assume in the following that all users have a common
preferred CBD arrival time,  = 0, and “late arrival” is prohibited. We then consider the follow-
ing commuting disutility function.
Assumption 5.1. The commuting disutility for a type ( j; k) user arriving at the destination at
time s is given by
c j;k(s) = c
(1)
j;k + c
(2)
k (s) + c
(3)
j;k (s) (5.19a)
where c(1)j;k  kl j; c(2)k (s)  k f (s); c(3)j;k (s)  kg(s   l j) (5.19b)
where f (s) is a continuous function of “schedule delay” s (= s   ) satisfying8>><>>: f (s)  0 for s  0f (s)!1 for s > 0 ; ; f 0(s) < 0 8s  0:
The function g(t) denotes the “early bird cost”11 for a user departing from his/her home at time
t(s; l j)  s   l j   lJ, which is a continuous function with the following properties:
g(t(s; l j)) > 0; g0(t(s; l j)) < 0; g00(t(s; l j)) < 0 8t   lJ
where the coefficients k, k, and k are values of travel time, schedule delay and activity at
home, respectively; they are arranged in an increasing order: 1 <    < K; 1 <    <
K; 1 <    < K.
11This type of disutility has been considered for expressing the heterogeneity in the residential location in the city
(Fosgerau and de Palma, 2012) and in the trip length within the urban network (Fosgerau, 2015).
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The present model can be viewed as a departure time choice equilibrium model with two types
of cost heterogeneity: the values of travel time, schedule delay, and activity at home depend on
the job k12, and the early bird cost depends on the residential location j. The main difference
between the conventional and present models related to whether the heterogeneity are given ex-
ogenously or not. Specifically, in a conventional model (with heterogeneous preferred departure
times and value of times) such as Newell (1987) and Lindsey (2004), a joint distribution of cost
heterogeneities is given exogenously. In the present model, the marginal distributions of cost het-
erogeneities, fR jg and fQkg, are given exogenously but the joint distribution fX j;kg is determined
as a result of job-location choice.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that Assumption 5.1 holds. Then the function c j;k(s) defined by (5.19)
satisfies the strict 3D-Monge property.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
As in Lemma 4.2, combining the fact that [3D-LP(x)] is the total commuting disutility min-
imization problem with the functional form of c j;k(s) leads to the following property of an equi-
librium departure time window.
Lemma 5.2. Under Assumption 5.1, the optimal solution x of [3D-LP(x)] satisfies8>><>>:
P
j2J
P
k2K xj;k(s) =  if s 2 Sˆ  SP
j2J
P
k2K xj;k(s) = 0 otherwise
(5.20)
where Sˆ  [ T; 0] of length T = Q=.
Then the problem [3D-LP(x)] reduces to a three-dimensional optimal transport problem with a
strict 3D-Monge property. That is
min
F2F
Z
[1;J][1;K]Sˆ
c(; ; s)dF(; ; s) (5.21)
where F 
n
F(;K; 0) =
P
j0R j0 ; F(J; ; 0) =
P
k0Qk0 ;
F(J;K; s) = (T + s); 8 2 [1; J]; 8 2 [1;K]; 8s 2 Sˆ
o
: (5.22)
where c(; ; s) is a continuous and submodular function that satisfies c( j; k; s) = c j;k(s); 8 j =
1; : : : ; J; 8k = 1; : : : ;K; 8s 2 Sˆ.
Based on the theory of optimal transport in Section 5.1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that the commuting disutility, c j;k(s), satisfies Assumption 5.1. Then,
the solution of the DTCE problem (5.21) (or [3D-LP(x)]) is unique and given by the Fre´chet–
Hoeffding distribution.
F(; ; s) = min
8>>><>>>:
X
j0
R j0 ;
X
k0
Qk0 ; (T + s)
9>>>=>>>; : (5.23)
To interpret the analytical solution, let us introduce a new index i 2 I and a joint distribution
fXig of fR jg and fQkg, which are determined by the northwest corner rule:
12This is consistent with the assumption in Takayama and Kuwahara (2017) of a positive correlation between the value
of time of users and their wage.
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Figure 7: Optimal path in three–dimensional index space
0. Initialized the indices with i := 1, j := 1 and k := 1.
1. Set Xi = min
n
R j;Qk
o
.
2. Reduce both R j and Qk by Xi: R j := R j   Xi and Qk := Qk   Xi. If any of R j and Qk
become zero, then these indices are increased by one.
3. If
P
i0iXi0 = Q then I = i and stop; otherwise i := i + 1 and go back to Step 2.
This procedure corresponds to solving the minimization problem of the first two terms of the
analytical solution (5.23). By using the unique joint distribution, the analytical solution reduces
to the following form.
F(; ; s) = min
8>><>>:X
i0i
Xi0 ; (T + s)
9>>=>>; (5.24)
The joint distribution fXig represents the demand distribution of the departure time choice prob-
lem. As in the previous sections, let us define the time si so that the cumulative capacity supply
(T + s) is equal to the cumulative demand
P
i0i Xi0 as follows.
si 
X
i0i
Xi0=   T (5.25)
Then, the regularities of the equilibrium flow pattern can be summarized as the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5.2. The equilibrium flow pattern x has the “sorting” property such that all users in
group i depart from the bottleneck in a time interval [si 1; si] of lengthXi= (i.e., si = si 1+Xi=),
and
s0   T < s1 < s2 <    < sI 1 < sI = 0 (5.26)
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From the determination process of the joint distribution, we see that job and location groups
are sorted in the increasing order of their indices, respectively. Hence, the proposition means that
users who live in locations closer to the CBD and have jobs with higher VOTs depart from the
bottleneck at times closer to the desired time. Figure 7 shows an example of the optimal index
path of the problem with J = 2;K = 4 and  = 1. We see that users depart from the bottleneck
in the following order along time s: ( j; k) = (1; 1); (1; 2); (2; 2); (2; 3); (2; 4).
Some final remarks about the analytical solution are in order. First, the interpretation of the
analytical solution provides a clear relationship between short-run and long-run choice problems.
It is easily seen that the determination of the joint distribution fXig corresponds to the long-run
job-location choice problem. For given this demand distribution, the problem (5.24) determines
the short-run departure time choice problem. Second, the solution can be understood from the
combination of the two 2D-Monge properties. To see this definitively, we define a new variable
X j;k as follows.
X j;k 
Z
Sˆ
x j;k(s)ds: (5.27)
Substituting the commuting disutility function (5.19) into the objective function of [3D-LP(x)],
we then see that Z(x) can be decomposed into the following two terms:
Z(x) = ZM(X) + ZS(x) (5.28)
where
ZM(X) 
X
j2J
X
k2K
c(1)j;kX j;k (5.29)
ZS(x) 
X
j2J
X
k2K
Z
Sˆ

c(2)k (s) + c
(3)
j;k (s)

x j;k(s)ds (5.30)
This implies that [3D-LP(x)] allows the following decomposition:
min
X0 : ZM(X) + Z

S(X) (5.31)
subject to
X
k2K
X j;k = R j 8 j 2 J (5.32)X
j2J
X j;k = Qk 8k 2 K (5.33)
where ZS(X)  minx0 : ZS(x j X) (5.34)
subject to
X
j2J
X
k2K
x j;k(s) =  8s 2 Sˆ (5.35)Z
Sˆ
x j;k(s)ds = X j;k 8 j 2 J ; 8k 2 K (5.36)
The subproblem (or lower-level problem) determines the short-run departure time choice equi-
librium for a given joint distribution of fR jg and fQkg. The master (or upper-level) problem
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determines the long-run job-location choice equilibrium based on the cost including the short-
run effect ZS(X). While the master and sub- problems should generally be solved iteratively in
general, the analytical solution implies that these problems can be solved sequentially. Specifi-
cally, the master problem can be solved by the northwest corner rule (i.e., the objective function
(5.31) satisfies the 2D-Monge property with respect to j and k), and the subproblem can also
be solved in a similar manner for a given optimal solution fX j;kg or equivalently fXig (i.e., the
objective function (5.34) satisfies the 2D-Monge property with respect to s and i).
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a systematic approach for analyzing the departure-time choice equi-
librium (DTCE) problem of a single bottleneck with heterogeneous commuters. The approach
is based on the fact that the DTCE is equivalently represented as a linear programming problem
with a special structure, which can be analytically solved by exploiting the theory of optimal
transport combined with Benders decomposition technique. Through applying the proposed ap-
proach to several types of model with heterogeneous commuters, it is revealed that the dynamic
equilibrium distribution of departure times exhibits striking regularities, in which commuters sort
themselves according to their attributes, such as desired arrival times, schedule delay functions
(value of times), and travel distances to a destination.
A straightforward extension of this approach would be to analyze models of simultaneous
departure time and route choice in a single bottleneck per route network (e.g., a single O-D
network with multiple parallel routes) (e.g., Kuwahara and Newell, 1987; Arnott et al., 1992;
Iryo et al., 2005; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007; Liu et al., 2015). Since the equilibrium condition can
be equivalently represented as a structured LP problem, the approach proposed herein could be
applied without significant modification.
Another interesting direction would be to extend the proposed approach to analyze the DTCE
problem in a corridor network with multiple bottlenecks (for a specific instance of the corridor
problem, see Akamatsu et al., 2015). Although a straightforward formulation of the problem in
a corridor network does not reduce to a LP problem, but instead just a linear complementarity
problem, the recent study by Fu et al. (2018) reveals that the solution of the DTCE assignment
with homogeneous commuters can be analytically constructed from that of the DSO assignment
formulated as a structured LP. Therefore, it would be expected that the solution of the DTCE
problem with heterogeneous commuters would also be obtained from an LP, which can be ana-
lyzed by extending the approach presented herein. The partial (positive) answer to this conjecture
is provided by Osawa et al. (in press), and a full treatment is planned for future work.
Appendix A. Point queue model
Appendix A.1. Formulation
According to Kuwahara and Akamatsu (1993, 1997), the point queue model can be repre-
sented by the following three conditions. First, the state equation for the number of users queuing
at the bottleneck E(t) is
E(t) = A(t)  D(t) (A.1a)
dE(t)=dt = (t)   (t) (A.1b)
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where D(t) denotes the cumulative departure flow at the bottleneck at time t, and its derivative
respect to time t is (t)  dD(t)=dt.
The second condition is the exit flow model. That is, the departure flow rate from the bottle-
neck at time t is
(t) =
8>><>>: if E(t) > 0min :[(t); ] if E(t) = 0 : (A.2)
The final condition concerns the relationship between the state variables and the queuing
delay. In the point queue model, the queuing delay d(t) for a user arriving at the bottleneck at
time t is the horizontal distance between the cumulative arrival curve A(t) and the cumulative
departure curve D(t). That is,
d(t) = E(t)= (A.3)
By combining these conditions, (A.1)–(A.3), we can obtain the condition (2.2a).
Appendix A.2. Non-negative and finiteness of arrival flow rate at the bottleneck
To examine the non-negative and finiteness of arrival flow rate at the bottleneck, it is sufficient
to check the condition u(s) < 1 for time s when x(s) > 0 because the arrival flow rate ((s)) is
given as x(s)=(s) (i.e., Eq.(2.3)) and (s) = 1 u(s) holds. Consider a time interval Sk  S
when there is at least one group, say k, that has a positive departure rate, i.e., xk(s) > 0. Then,
the condition (2.11) can be written as
ck(s) + u(s)   vk = 0 8s 2 Sk (A.4)
This implies that
u(s) =  ck(s) 8s 2 Sk (A.5)
Therefore, ck(s) >  1 asserts that u(s) < 1 and ((s)) > 0 hold.
Appendix B. Strong duality and complementarity slackness for the problem [2D-LP(x)]
Appendix B.1. Strong duality
We first prove the strong duality of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u;v)], both of which have
infinite-dimensional decision variables. We first observe the weak duality.
Theorem B.1. Let x and (u;v) be arbitrary feasible solutions of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u;v)],
respectively. Then, we have Z(x)  Zˇ(u; v).
Proof. We have
Z(x)   Zˇ(u;v) =
X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s)xk(s)ds + 
Z
S
u(s)ds  
X
k2K
Qkvk
=
X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s)xk(s)ds + 
Z
S
u(s)ds  
X
k2K
vk
Z
S
xk(s)ds
=
Z
S
2666664X
k2K
xk(s) (ck(s) + u(s)   vk) + u(s)
0BBBBB@  X
k2K
xk(s)
1CCCCCA
3777775ds (B.1)
 0
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where the inequality is due to (2.7), (2.8), and (2.10). We thus have Z(x)  Zˇ(u;v). 
Next, we divide the interval S to several pieces. Let N be an arbitrary positive integer, and
let the sub-interval be defined by
Sn  [s + (n   1)S; s + nS) n = 1; 2; : : : ;N
with S  (s   s)=N. Moreover, let ck and ck be piece-wise constant (step/staircase) functions
defined as
ck 
8>>>>><>>>>>:
cmaxk;1 (s 2 S1)
:::
cmaxk;N (s 2 SN)
; ck 
8>>>>><>>>>>:
cmink;1 (s 2 S1)
:::
cmink;N (s 2 SN)
with
cmaxk;n  supfck(s) j s 2 Sng; cmink;n  inffck(s) j s 2 Sng:
Then, both functions belong to the following function set
PCN 
n
function f : S ! R
 f (s) is constant over Sn for n = 1; : : : ;No
Now, consider the following problems:
 [2D-LP(x)-u]: a problem analogous to [2D-LP(x)] with ck(s) replaced by ck and the con-
straint xk(s) 2 PCN is added.
 [2D-LP(x)-l]: a problem analogous to [2D-LP(x)] with ck(s) replaced by ck and the con-
straint xk(s) 2 PCN is added.
 [2D-LP(u;v)-u]: a problem analogous to [2D-LP(u;v)] with ck(s) replaced by ck and the
constraint u(s) 2 PCN is added.
 [2D-LP(u;v)-l]: a problem analogous to [2D-LP(u;v)] with ck(s) replaced by ck and the
constraint u(s) 2 PCN is added.
Notice that those four problems can be regarded as LPs with finite-dimensional decision variables
since xk(s) and u(s) are piece-wise constant functions. Therefore, the strong duality must hold
between [2D-LP(x)-u] and [2D-LP(u;v)-u], and between [2D-LP(x)-l] and [2D-LP(u;v)-l].
Now, let val[  ] and F [  ] be the optimal value and feasible set of problem [  ]. Then we have
the following lemma.
Lemma B.1. For any N > 0, we have
0  val[2D-LP(x)]   val[2D-LP(u;v)]  val[2D-LP(x)-u]   val[2D-LP(u;v)-l]
= val[2D-LP(x)-u]   val[2D-LP(x)-l]
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Proof. The first inequality is due to the weak duality, and the equality follows since val[2D-
LP(u;v)-l] and val[2D-LP(x)-l] are the primal-dual pair of finite-dimensional LPs. Thus, we
only show the second inequality.
We first show val[2D-LP(x)]  val[2D-LP(x)-u]. Let Z(x) be the objective function of [2D-
LP(x)-u]. Then, from ck(s)  ck(s), we have Z(x)  Z(x) for any x  0. Moreover, we have
F [2D-LP(x)-u]  F [2D-LP(x)] since [2D-LP(x)-u] has additional constraints xk(s) 2 PCN(k 2
K ). Thus we have val[2D-LP(x)]  val[2D-LP(x)-u].
Next, we show val[2D-LP(u;v)]  val[2D-LP(u;v)-l]. Notice that Zˇ(u;v) serves as the ob-
jective function of [2D-LP(u;v)-l] as well as [2D-LP(u;v)]. Moreover, we haveF [2D-LP(u;v)-l]
 F [2D-LP(u;v)] since F [2D-LP(u;v)-l] has additional constraints xk(s) 2 PCN(k 2 K ) and
it follows ck(s) + u(s)   vk  0 ) ck(s) + u(s)   vk  0. Hence we have val[2D-LP(u;v)] 
val[2D-LP(u; v)-l]. This completes the proof. 
Using this lemma, we can show the strong duality of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u;v)].
Theorem B.2. Suppose that ck(s) is continuous over S. Then we have val[2D-LP(x)]= val[2D-
LP(u;v)].
Proof. First we fix N > 0 arbitrarily. Let xN and xN be the optima of [2D-LP(x)-u] and [2D-
LP(x)-l], respectively. Noting xNk (s); xNk (s) 2 PCN, we denote the n-th constant of xNk (s) and
xNk (s) by x
N
k;n and xNk;n, respectively, for each k 2 K . Moreover, let N  0 be defined by
N  max
n
ck(s)   ck(s)
 k 2 K ; s 2 So
= max
n
cmaxk;n   cmink;n
 k 2 K ; n 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Ngo :
Then, we have
val[2D-LP(x)-u]   val[2D-LP(x)-l]
=
X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s)x
N
k (s)ds  
X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s)x
N
k (s)ds

X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s)xNk (s)ds  
X
k2K
Z
S
ck(s)x
N
k (s)ds

X
k2K
Z
S
NxNk (s)ds
= N
X
k2K
Qk (B.2)
where the first inequality follows since xN is the optimum of [2D-LP(x)-u] and xN belongs to
F [2D-LP(x)-u]. Since ck(s) is continuous, we have limN!1 N = 0. This together with (B.2)
and Lemma B.1 yields val[2D-LP(x)]= val[2D-LP(u;v)]. This completes the proof. 
In the above theorem, we assumed that ck(s) is continuous over S. However, even when ck(s)
is discontinuous at a finite number of points on S, we can obtain the same result.
Corollary B.1. Suppose that there exist sˆm (m = 1; 2; : : : ;M) such that ck(s) is continuous over
S n fsˆ1; : : : ; sˆMg. Then we have val[2D-LP(x)]= val[2D-LP(u;v)].
Proof. Considering the finitely many sub-intervals [s; sˆ1); [sˆ1; sˆ2); : : : ; [sˆM; s], we can prove the
corollary in a similar manner.
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Appendix B.2. Equivalence of complementarity slackness conditions
Notice that (B.1) implies
Z(x)   Zˇ(u;v) =
Z
S
2666664X
k2K
xk(s) (ck(s) + u(s)   vk) + u(s)
0BBBBB@  X
k2K
xk(s)
1CCCCCA
3777775ds:
Hence, if x and (u;v) satisfy (2.11)–(2.12), then we have Z(x)  Zˇ(u; v) = 0; that is, x and (u;v)
are optima of [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u;v)], respectively.
On the contrary, if x and (u;v) optimize [2D-LP(x)] and [2D-LP(u;v)], respectively, then we
have Z(x)   Zˇ(u;v) = 0; that is, (2.11)–(2.12) are satisfied13.
Appendix C. Proofs of Monge property
Appendix C.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1
We show that the function c : K  S ! R defined by (3.9) is a strict submodular:
ck(s) + ck+1(s0) < ck+1(s) + ck(s0) for all s < s0; 1  k < K: (C.1)
The condition (C.1) can be rewritten using f () as follows.
f ((k+1; s) + s)   f ((k+1; s))
s
<
f ((k; s) + s)   f ((k; s))
s
(C.2)
where s  s0 s > 0. The strict convexity of the function f implies that the slope monotonically
increases with the increase of . Combining this property with (k+1; s) < (k; s) (* k <
k+1), we conclude that Eq.(C.2), and thus Eq.(C.1), hold true. 
Appendix C.2. Proof of Lemma 4.1
We show that the function c : K S ! R defined by (4.1) is a strict supermodular for s  0:
ck(s) + ck+1(s0) > ck+1(s) + ck(s0) for all s < s0  0; 1  k < K: (C.3)
The condition (C.3) can be rewritten as follows.
(k   k+1)  ( f e(s)   f e(s0)) > 0 (C.4)
This holds true because k   k+1 > 0 and f e() is a decreasing function of s (or ). 
13In this case, the equalities in (2.11) and (2.12) hold almost everywhere over S.
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Appendix C.3. Proof of Lemma 5.1
We prove that the function c: JKS ! R defined by (5.19) satisfies the three-dimensional
Monge property. To do so, we show that the function c is submodular with respect to any two of
its arguments:
c j;k(s) + c j;k+1(s0) < c j;k+1(s) + c j;k(s0) for all s  s0  0; 1  k < K; 8 j 2 J (C.5a)
c j;k(s) + c j+1;k(s0) < c j+1;k(s) + c j;k(s0) for all s  s0  0; 1  j < J; 8k 2 K (C.5b)
c j;k(s) + c j+1;k+1(s) < c j+1;k(s) + c j;k+1(s) for all 1  j < J; 1  k < K; 8s  0 (C.5c)
By a straightforward manipulation, we have the following equivalent conditions:
(k   k+1)
f (s0)   f (s)
s
+ (k   k+1)
g(s0   l j)   g(s   l j)
s
> 0 (C.6a)
  1
l
 
g(s0   l j+1)   g(s   l j+1)
s
  g(s
0   l j)   g(s   l j)
s
!
> 0 (C.6b)
  (k   k+1) + (k   k+1)
g(s   l j+1)   g(s   l j)
l
> 0 (C.6c)
where s  s0   s > 0 and l  l j   l j+1 > 0. The first line holds true because k   k+1 <
0; k   k+1 < 0 and f 0(s); g0(t) < 0; the second line holds true because g00(t) < 0; and the third
line holds true because k   k+1 < 0. 
Appendix D. Other proofs in Section 4
Appendix D.1. Proof of Proposition 4.2
By solving the following recursive equation:
vk := v

k+1   ck+1( sk) + ck( sk) = vk+1 + ˆk f e( sk) 8k = 1; : : : ;K   1: (D.1)
with the boundary condition vK = cK( T) = ˆK f e( sK), we can easily see that the analytical
solution (4.8) is obtained. By substituting v into a user’s optimal choice condition, we have
u(s) = vk   k f e(s) 8s 2 [ sk; sk 1]; 8k 2 K (D.2)
Combining the queuing condition (2.4) with Lemma 4.2 yieldsX
k2K
xk(s) = 0 <  ) u(s) = 0 8s 2 S n Sˆ: (D.3)
We thus conclude that Eq.(4.9) holds. 
Appendix D.2. Proof of Lemma 4.4
Suppose that the objective function of the master problem is convex. Then the optimality
condition of the master problem (4.24) is given as the following variational inequality (VI) prob-
lem.
Find s 2 
  fEqs.(4.25) and (4.26)g such thatX
h2H
rZM(sh)  (sh   sh)  0 s 2 
: (D.4)
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where the element of the gradient of the objective function rZM(sh) is given by
@ZM(sh)
@shk
=
8>><>>:ˆk f e( sek) if h = eˆk f l(slk) if h = l (D.5)
We then show the strict monotonicity of rZM(sh). For any two nonnegative vectors sh and s˜h
(sh , s˜h), we have
(rZM(se)   rZM(s˜e))  (se   s˜e) = 
X
k2K
ˆkf f e( sek)   f e( s˜ek)g(sek   s˜ek) > 0 (D.6a)
(rZM(sl)   rZM(s˜l))  (sl   s˜l) = 
X
k2K
ˆkf f l(slk)   f l(s˜lk)g(slk   s˜lk) > 0 (D.6b)
The last inequalities of both equations follow from the facts that f e(s) is a decreasing function of
s and f l(s) is an increasing function of s. Thus, we conclude that the master problem (4.24) is
actually a convex programming problem and the optimal solution of it (or the VI problem (D.4))
is unique. 
Appendix D.3. Proof of Proposition 4.5
Because Properties 1 and 2 of Proposition 4.5 are trivial, we show the proof of the property 3
only. If the strict inequality holds in constraint (4.25) or condition (4.27) (i.e., an optimal solution
of the problem (4.24) is in the interior of the feasible region), the equilibrium costs of early and
late arrival users in group k must be identical (i.e., vek = v
l
k ):X
k0k
n
ˆk0 f e( sek0 )
o
=
X
k0k
n
ˆk0 f l(slk0)
o
8k 2 K (D.7)
which implies
ˆk f e( sek ) = ˆk f l(slk ) 8k 2 K (D.8)
We thus have Eq.(4.28). 
We give an example that an interior optimal solution is always feasible and thus exists. As-
sume that k=k =  (constant) for all k 2 K and that Eq.(D.8) is satisfied for all k 2 K , i.e.,8>><>>:(sek + slk) =
P
k0kQk0
f e( sek) =  f l(slk)
8k 2 K (D.9)
From these equations, we first see that sek and s
l
k are positive for
P
k0kQk0 > 0. This is because
both f e( s) and f l(s) are zero at s = 0 and are strictly increasing functions of s > 0. We then
consider the consecutive groups k and k+1 and assume that sek  sek+1. From the second condition
of Eq.(D.9), we have
f l(slk)  f l(slk+1) , slk  slk+1: (D.10)
We thus conclude that
sek + s
l
k  sek+1 + slk+1: (D.11)
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However, this condition contradicts the first condition of Eq.(D.9) (i.e., flow conservation), i.e.,
sek < s
e
k+1 must hold. By the same logic, we can have s
l
k < s
l
k+1. Hence we finally obtain
0 < sh1 < s
h
2 <    < shK 1 < shK 8h 2 H (D.12)
which shows the existence of an interior optimal solution.
Appendix D.4. Proof of the strict monotonicity of vh(Xh)
We show that the strict monotonicity of vh(Xh) for the case h = e (we omit the proof for the
case h = l because almost the same discussion holds). From the analytical solution (4.8) and the
definition of sk, the equilibrium trip cost can be expressed as an explicit function of ye:
vek (X
e) =
X
k0k
ˆk0  f e( Pmk0 Xem=) 8k 2 K (D.13)
or its vector-matrix form of
v(Xe) = LTc( se(Xe)) (D.14)
where L (LT) is the lower (upper) triangle matrix, c( se(Xe))  [ˆ1  f e( se1); : : : ; ˆK  f e( seK)]T
and se(Xe)  [Xe1=; : : : ;
P
k0K Xek0=]
T = (1=)LXe. We thus have, for any two nonnegative
vectors Xe and X˜e,
(v(Xe)   v(X˜e))  (Xe   X˜e) = fLT(c( se(Xe))   c( se(X˜e)))gT(Xe   X˜e)
= (c( se(Xe))   c( se(X˜e))TL(Xe   X˜e)
= 
X
k2K
ˆkf f e( sek)   f e( s˜ek)g(sek   s˜ek) > 0
The last inequality follows from the fact that f e(s) is a decreasing function of s. Thus, we
conclude that the variational inequality problem (4.29) is a monotone problem. Furthermore, if
the function f e() is differentiable, we have
@vk(X
e)
@Xek0
=
8>><>>:( 1=)
P
k0k ˆk0  f 0e( sek0) if k = k0
( 1=)Pmmaxfk;k0g ˆm  f 0e( sem) if k , k0 : (D.15)
This shows that rv(Xe) is symmetric and v(Xe) is integrable.
References
Aggarwal, A., Park, J., 1988. Notes on searching in multidimensional monotone arrays. In: Proceedings of the 29th
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE, pp. 497–512.
Akamatsu, T., 2007. A system of tradable bottleneck permits for general networks. JSCE Journal of Infrastructure Plan-
ning and Management 63 (3), 287–301.
Akamatsu, T., Sato, S., Nguyen, L. X., 2006. Tradable time-of-day bottleneck permits for morning commuters. JSCE
Journal of Infrastructure Planning and Management 62 (4), 605–620.
Akamatsu, T., Wada, K., 2017. Tradable network permits: A new scheme for the most efficient use of network capacity.
Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies 79, 178–195.
33
Akamatsu, T., Wada, K., Hayashi, S., 2015. The corridor problem with discrete multiple bottlenecks. Transportation
Research Part B: Methodological 81, 808–829.
Arnott, R., 1998. Congestion tolling and urban spatial structure. Journal of Regional Science 38 (3), 495–504.
Arnott, R., de Palma, A., Lindsey, R., 1988. Schedule delay and departure time decisions with heterogeneous commuters.
Transportation Research Record 476, 56–57.
Arnott, R., de Palma, A., Lindsey, R., 1992. Route choice with heterogeneous drivers and group-specific congestion
costs. Regional Science and Urban Economics 22 (1), 71–102.
Arnott, R., de Palma, A., Lindsey, R., 1994. The welfare effects of congestion tolls with heterogeneous commuters.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 28 (2), 139–161.
Ban, X. J., Pang, J.-S., Liu, H. X., Ma, R., 2012. Continuous-time point-queue models in dynamic network loading.
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 46 (3), 360–380.
Bein, W.W., Brucker, P., Park, J. K., Pathak, P. K., 1995. AMonge property for the d-dimensional transportation problem.
Discrete Applied Mathematics 58 (2), 97–109.
Berliant, M., Tabuchi, T., 2018. Equilibrium commuting. Economic Theory 65 (3), 609–627.
Burkard, R. E., 2007. Monge properties, discrete convexity and applications. European Journal of Operational Research
176, 1–14.
Cambanis, S., Simons, G., Stout, W., 1976. Inequalities for Ek(x; y) when the marginals are fixed. Zeitschrift fu¨r
Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und Verwandte Gebiete 36 (4), 285–294.
Cohen, Y., 1987. Commuter welfare under peak-period congestion tolls: Who gains and who loses? International Journal
of Transport Economics 14 (3), 239–266.
Daganzo, C. F., 1985. The uniqueness of a time-dependent equilibrium distribution of arrivals at a single bottleneck.
Transportation Science 19 (1), 29–37.
Daganzo, C. F., 2013. System optimum and pricing for the day-long commute with distributed demand, autos and transit.
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 55, 98–117.
Doan, K., Ukkusuri, S., Han, L., 2011. On the existence of pricing strategies in the discrete time heterogeneous single
bottleneck model. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 45 (9), 1483–1500.
Dubuc, S., Kagabo, I., Marcotte, P., 1999. A note on the uniqueness of solutions to the transportation problem. INFOR:
Information Systems and Operational Research 37 (2), 141–148.
Facchinei, F., Pang, J.-S., 2003. Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities and Complementarity Problems Volume I.
Springer-Verlag New York.
Fosgerau, M., 2015. Congestion in the bathtub. Economics of Transportation 4 (4), 241–255.
Fosgerau, M., de Palma, A., 2012. Congestion in a city with a central bottleneck. Journal of Urban Economics 71 (3),
269–277.
Fu, H., Akamatsu, T., Wada, K., 2018. Dynamic traffic assignment in a corridor network: Optimum vs. equilibrium.
Presented at the 7th International Symposium on Dynamic Traffic Assignment.
Gubins, S., Verhoef, E. T., 2014. Dynamic bottleneck congestion and residential land use in the monocentric city. Journal
of Urban Economics 80, 51–61.
Han, K., Friesz, T. L., Yao, T., 2013. A partial differential equation formulation of Vickrey’s bottleneck model, part I:
Methodology and theoretical analysis. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 49, 55–74.
Harker, P. T., Pang, J.-S., 1990. Finite-dimensional variational inequality and nonlinear complementarity problems: A
survey of theory, algorithms and applications. Mathematical Programming 48 (1-3), 161–220.
Hendrickson, C., Kocur, G., 1981. Schedule delay and departure time decisions in a deterministic model. Transportation
Science 15 (1), 62–77.
Herbert, J. D., Stevens, B. H., 1960. A model for the distribution of residential activity in urban areas. Journal of Regional
Science 2 (2), 21–36.
Hoffman, A. J., 1963. On simple linear programming problems. In: Klee, V. (Ed.), Convexity: Proceedings of Symposia
in Pure Mathematics. Vol. 7. American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, pp. 317–327.
Hoffman, A. J., 1985. On greedy algorithms that succeed. In: Anderson, I. (Ed.), Survey in Combinatrics. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 97–112.
Iryo, T., Yoshii, T., 2007. Equivalent optimization problem for finding equilibrium in the bottleneck model with departure
time choices. In: Heydecker, B. (Ed.), Selected Proceedings of the 4th IMA International Conference on Mathematics
in Transport. Emerald, London, pp. 231–244.
Iryo, T., Yoshii, T., Asakura, Y., 2005. Mathematical analysis of equilibrium in departure time choice problems. JSCE
Journal of Infrastructure Planning and Management IV-66 (779), 105–118.
Jin, W.-l., 2015. Point queue models: A unified approach. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 77, 1–16.
Kantorovich, L., 1942. On the transfer of masses. Doklady Akademii Nauk USSR 37, 227–229.
Kantorovich, L., 1948. On a problem of Monge. Uspekhi Mathematicheskikh Nauk 3 (2), 225–226 (in Russian).
Kuwahara, M., Akamatsu, T., 1993. Dynamic equilibrium assignment with queues for one-to-many OD pattern. In: Da-
ganzo, C. F. (Ed.), Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory. Elsevior,
34
Berkeley, pp. 185–204.
Kuwahara, M., Akamatsu, T., 1997. Decomposition of the reactive dynamic assignments with queues for a many-to-many
origin-destination pattern. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 31 (1), 1–10.
Kuwahara, M., Newell, G. F., 1987. Queue evolution on freeways leading to a single core city during the morning peak.
Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory, 21–40.
Larsson, T., Lindberg, P. O., Patriksson, M., Rydergren, C., 2002. On Traffic Equilibrium Models with a Nonlinear
Time/Money Relation. Springer US, Boston, MA, pp. 19–31.
Lindsey, R., 2004. Existence, uniqueness, and trip cost function properties of user equilibrium in the bottleneck model
with multiple user classes. Transportation Science 38 (3), 293–314.
Liu, Y., Nie, Y. M., Hall, J., 2015. A semi-analytical approach for solving the bottleneck model with general user
heterogeneity. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 71, 56–70.
Newell, G. F., 1987. The morning commute for nonidentical travelers. Transportation Science 21 (2), 74–88.
Nie, Y. M., Zhang, M. H., 2009. Numerical solution procedures for the morning commute problem. Mathematical and
Computer Modelling 49 (7-8), 1295–1310.
Osawa, M., Fu, H., Akamatsu, T., in press. First-best dynamic assignment of commuters with endogenous heterogeneities
in a corridor network. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological.
Rachev, S. T., Ru¨schendorf, L., 1998. Mass Transportation Problems: Volume 1: Theory; Volume 2: Applications.
Springer Verlag.
Ramadurai, G., Ukkusuri, S. V., Zhao, J., Pang, J.-S., 2010. Linear complementarity formulation for single bottleneck
model with heterogeneous commuters. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 44 (2), 193–214.
Smith, M. J., 1984. The existence of a time-dependent equilibrium distribution of arrivals at a single bottleneck. Trans-
portation Science 18 (4), 385–394.
Takayama, Y., Kuwahara, M., 2017. Bottleneck congestion and residential location of heterogeneous commuters. Journal
of Urban Economics 100, 65–79.
Tchen, A. H., 1980. Inequalities for distributions with given marginals. The Annals of Probability 8 (4), 814–827.
van den Berg, V., Verhoef, E. T., 2011. Winning or losing from dynamic bottleneck congestion pricing? Journal of Public
Economics 95 (7-8), 983–992.
Vickrey, W. S., 1969. Congestion theory and transport investment. American Economic Review 59 (2), 251–260.
Vickrey, W. S., 1973. Pricing, metering, and efficiently using urban transportation facilities. Highway Research Record
476, 36–48.
Villani, C., 2008. Optimal Transport: Old and New (Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften). Springer Verlag.
Wada, K., Akamatsu, T., 2010. An e-market mechanism for implementing tradable bottleneck permits. JSCE Journal of
Infrastructure Planning and Management 66 (2), 160–177.
Wheaton, W. C., 1974. Linear programming and locational equilibrium. Journal of Urban Economics 1 (3), 278–287.
35
